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We study effects of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in the prescription drug market. 
There are two pharmaceutical firms providing horizontally differentiated (branded) drugs. 
Patients differ in their susceptibility to the drugs. If DTCA is allowed, this can be employed to 
induce (additional) patient visits. Physicians perfectly observe the patients' type (of illness), 
but rely on information to prescribe the correct drug. Drug information is conveyed by 
marketing (detailing), creating a captive and a selective segment of physicians. First, we show 
that detailing, DTCA and price (if not regulated) are complementary strategies for the firms. 
Thus, allowing DTCA induces more detailing and higher prices. Second, firms benefit from 
DTCA if detailing competition is not too fierce, which is true if investing in detailing is 
sufficiently costly. Otherwise, firms are better off with a ban on DTCA. Finally, DTCA tends 
to lower welfare if insurance is generous (low copayments) and/or price regulation is lenient. 
The desirability of DTCA also depends on whether or not the regulator is concerned with 
firms' profit. 
JEL Code: I11, L13, L65, M37. 
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The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most advertising-intensive industries (see e.g.,
Scherer and Ross, 1990). Promotional expenditures often amount to 20-30 percent of sales,
sometimes well exceeding expenditures on R&D.1 However, contrary to most other indus-
tries promotional spending is not targeted at consumers, but rather at prescribing physi-
cians. While this can be explained by the important role of the physician as the patient￿ s
agent, another important reason lies with the regulatory restrictions on direct-to-consumer
advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs that are present in most countries.
Recently, however, there has been a trend towards a more liberal legislation on DTCA.
In the US, the Food and Drug Administration issued new guidelines in 1997 for broadcast
advertising of prescription drugs directly to consumers, facilitating the use of television for
DTCA. A similar liberalisation is carried through in New Zealand. In the European Union
a 5-year pilot project of allowing DTCA for three long-term and chronic diseases (diabetes,
AIDS and asthma) was recently proposed, though rejected.
The role of DTCA has generated a controversial debate (see e.g., Wilkes et al., 2000).
Opponents claim that DTCA causes physicians to waste valuable time during encounters
with patients and encourages the use of expensive and sometimes unnecessary medications.
Proponents argue that DTCA increases the consumers￿awareness and knowledge about
available medical treatments, and this may enable them to detect a possible disease at an
earlier stage and take part more actively in the choice of medication.
This paper aims at contributing to the debate about DTCA along two di⁄erent dimen-
sions: First, the debate seems to focus on isolated e⁄ects of DTCA, and ignore that phar-
maceutical companies already spend tremendous amounts of money on promotion aimed
at in￿ uencing the physicians￿prescription choices.2 In this paper we therefore explicitly
1According to Schweitzer (1997) the marketing expenses for three of the largest US pharmaceutical com-
panies - Merck, P￿zer, and Eli Lilly - ranged from 21 to 40% of annual sales, while the R&D expenses varied
between 11 and 15%. Similar ￿gures are reported from Novartis and Aventis, the largest pharmaceutical
companies in Europe. See also Hurwitz and Caves (1988) for US data or Zweifel and Breyer (1997) for ￿gures
in Germany and Switzerland.
2Rosenthal et al. (2002) report that annual spending on DTCA for prescription drugs in the US tripled
between 1996 and 2000, when it reached $2,5 billion. Despite this increase, DTCA accounts for only 15%
2analyse the interaction between advertising directed at consumers, on the one hand, and
physician-oriented marketing, on the other.
Second, a number of empirical studies have recently addressed various aspects of DTCA
(e.g., Berndt et al., 1995, 1997, Calfee et al., 2002, Iizuka, 2004, Iizuka and Jin, 2005, Ling
et al., 2002, Rosenthal et al., 2002). Theoretical studies of DTCA are scant. Taking into
account the speci￿c market conditions and institutional arrangements in the prescription
drug market, we aim at ￿lling this gap in the literature.
In this paper we analyse how the availability of DTCA a⁄ects ￿rms￿spending on de-
tailing, the drug prices, and eventually pro￿ts. We are also interested in the e⁄ects of
DTCA on the physicians￿prescription decisions, the bene￿t to the patients, and eventually
social welfare. We consider both the case of price competition and the case of price regula-
tion. This enables us to compare the e⁄ects of DTCA across health care systems in which
￿rms compete on price (e.g., in the US) and systems in which prices are regulated (e.g., in
Europe).3
We restrict attention to competition between patented (or branded) drugs.4 More pre-
cisely, we consider a particular therapeutic market with two pharmaceutical ￿rms o⁄ering
horizontally di⁄erentiated drugs. If we think of high cholesterol, for instance, the two ￿rms
could be Merck and P￿zer o⁄ering their drugs Zocor and Lipitor, respectively. In the
pharmaceutical industry a patent is granted for a drug￿ s novel chemical composition rather
than its therapeutic properties. Many new pharmaceuticals receive patents in spite of be-
ing functionally similar to existing drugs. As such, their introduction expands physicians￿
choices and can pose a competitive threat to established drugs with the same or similar
of the total drug promotion expenses. Promotion to professionals (e.g., o¢ ce-based promotion, journal
advertising, free samples) accounts for the residual 85%, with a spending of $13,241 billion in 2000. Note
that spending on conferences, meetings, events and also gifts are not included, so the ￿gures underestimate
total promotional expenditures on physicians.
3Most European countries exercise some form of price regulation on prescription drugs. See e.g. Mossialos
(1998) for an overview of the di⁄erent ways drug prices are regulated in Europe.
4Generic drugs are rarely advertised to any great extent. Studies of generic competition have mostly
been concerned with the issue of whether advertising act as a barrier for generic entry. See, for instance, the
empirical work by Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Grabowski and Vernon (1992), and Scott Morton (2000).
3indications.5 Patented drugs have by de￿nition di⁄erent chemical compounds, potentially
involving di⁄erent e⁄ectiveness, contraindications and side-e⁄ects to which patients may
react di⁄erently. Thus, optimal treatment depends on the individual case and is therefore a
matter of matching. As there is typically no strict ranking of the drugs within therapeutic
markets, the familiar Hotelling-model of product di⁄erentiation proves to be suitable for
our purposes.
The informational structure is important in pharmaceutical markets. We assume that
patients cannot observe their disease type nor the treatment e⁄ects of the di⁄erent drugs.6 A
fraction of the individuals su⁄ering from the disease in question actually seeks a physician￿ s
advice. The remaining fraction is also ill, but for some reason does not visit a physician.7
These individuals are ￿ potential￿drug consumers and the fraction measures the size of the
potential market.8 If allowed by the health authorities, the pharmaceutical ￿rms can adver-
tise their drugs directly to consumers. We assume that DTCA a⁄ects the potential patients￿
decision of whether or not to seek medical advice by a physician. An ad from, say, ￿rm 1
(Merck), informs the patient about the existence of a condition (high cholesterol), possible
symptoms (high blood pressure) and risks (e.g., coronary heart disease, diabetes), as well as
the existence of a treatment (Zocor). Besides this the ads provide no valuable information
to the patient. Thus, in our model DTCA merely prompts physician visits. This approach
follows closely the empirical work by Iizuka and Jin (2005) who ￿nd that DTCA leads to a
5Lu and Comanor (1998) ￿nd that all but 13 of 148 new branded chemical entities introduced in the
US between 1978-87 had at least one fairly close substitute; the average number of substitutes being 1.86.
Scherer (2000) reports that the number of drugs per symptom group ranged from 1 to 50, with a median of
5 drugs and a mean of 6.04.
6There are several justi￿cations for this. First, (most) patients have not taken medical training and are
thus not capable of diagnosing. Second, drugs are typically not search goods, implying that treatment e⁄ects
cannot be easily inferred from reading about a drug￿ s chemical compounds, e⁄ectiveness, etc.
7There may be several reasons for why not everybody su⁄ering from a condition seeks medical care. First,
some individuals receive weaker symptoms than others. In fact, some persons do not receive any signal of
being ill at all. Second, individuals may have di⁄erent skills or experience in interpreting symptoms. For
complicated diseases this may lead to a large fraction of non-visiting patients.
8It is well known that several illnesses are substantially underdiagnosed (or undertreated). Iizuka (2004)
present such measures, showing wide variation between various therapeutic areas.
4large increase in the number of patient visits, a moderate increase in the time spent with
physicians, but to no e⁄ect on physicians￿choice among prescription drugs within a ther-
apeutic class.9 Another empirical study by Iizuka (2004) ￿nds that ￿rms spend more on
DTCA when the number of potential patients, rather than the number of currently treated
patients, is large. This is also an outcome of our model, as will be shown later in this paper.
Physicians are a priori uninformed about the two drugs. In order to be able to prescribe
the most suitable treatment, they require information about the available drugs. Obviously,
physicians may search for drug information, for instance, by reading medical journals. In
this paper, we focus on another, and less costly, source of information for the physicians,
namely marketing.10 Since physician-oriented marketing is costly, ￿rms are unable to reach
every physician in the market. Thus, there are potentially three types of physicians in the
market: ￿ captive￿physicians who have received information by only one of the ￿rms, ￿ selec-
tive￿physicians who have received information by both ￿rms, and uninformed physicians
who have received information by neither ￿rm.11 Selective physicians trade o⁄ the two
available drugs (say, Zocor against Lipitor). Captive physicians trade o⁄ the drug they are
aware of (say, Zocor) against an outside treatment (say, physical exercise), while uninformed
physicians prescribe the outside treatment. Thus, the ￿rms face a monopolistic (captive)
and a competitive (selective) market segment.
This modelling approach builds on the advertising framework introduced by Butters
(1977) and developed for di⁄erentiated products by Grossman and Shapiro (1984). More-
over, it is also consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Berndt et al. (1995,
1997) for the anti-ulcer industry. Applying a method that distinguishes between "industry-
expanding" and "rivalrous" marketing e⁄orts, they ￿nd that physician-oriented marketing
9We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the empirical ￿ndings on this issue.
10Azoulay (2002) ￿nds that both marketing and scienti￿c evidence directly in￿ uence physicians￿prescrip-
tion choices, with marketing having a more pronounced in￿ uence. He also ￿nds that clinical outputs positively
a⁄ect ￿rms￿marketing e⁄orts, and concludes that drug advertising may perform an important informative
function.
11In our model physicians are captive since they have received information from one ￿rm only. However,
an alternative interpretation is that these physicians actually ignore or reject information from one of the
￿rms for the purpose of, for instance, receiving future bene￿ts like sponsored conference trips, etc. This more
persuasive view of advertising has been employed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
5involves both elements. In our model physician-oriented marketing expands the monopolis-
tic segment(s) vis-a-vis the outside drug (market-expansion), but, as an element of rivalry, it
also expands the competitive segment at the expense of the monopolistic segment (business-
stealing).
Based on this modelling approach, we derive the following results. First, we ￿nd that
detailing and DTCA are complementary strategies for the pharmaceutical ￿rms. DTCA
triggers more patient visits, which makes it pro￿table for the ￿rms to spend more on detailing
to get the physicians to prescribe their drug. Thus, allowing DTCA leads to higher levels
of detailing. This result is consistent with empirical ￿ndings. For instance, Rosenthal et
al. (2002) demonstrate that spending on DTCA increased dramatically after the new FDA
guidelines in 1997, and tripled for the whole period of 1996 and 2000, ending on $2,5 billion.
For the same period they also show that promotional spending on physician increased from
$8,3 to $13,2 billion.
If ￿rms are allowed to set price, we show that the complementarity between the two
marketing strategies is reinforced. The reason is that physician-oriented marketing enables
the ￿rms to charge higher prices. This result is interesting for two reasons: First, it contrasts
Grossman and Shapiro￿ s (1984) ￿nding that informative advertising leads to lower prices.
The basic di⁄erence between the two models is that we assume elastic demand in the
monopolistic segment, while they assume inelastic demand in this segment. In our model a
￿rm faces two e⁄ects of lowering its price; (i) it steals some consumers from the rival in the
competitive segment; and (ii) it increases the demand in the monopolistic segment. In the
Grossman-Shapiro (1984) model only the ￿rst e⁄ect is present. Interestingly, it turns out
that this assumption qualitatively changes the e⁄ect of marketing upon prices.
Second, the price e⁄ect of detailing is consistent with empirical ￿ndings. In the context of
branded competition, Rizzo (1999) analyses the demand for antihypertensive drugs for 1988-
1993, and ￿nds that detailing lowers the price elasticity. This e⁄ect is attributed to detailing
being persuasive rather than informative.12 We show that informative advertising can also
lead to higher prices. One cannot, therefore, conclude from the empirical observation of a
less price elastic demand that promotion to physicians is necessarily persuasive.
12There has been quite an extensive debate on whether physician-oriented marketing is persuasive or
informative, see e.g., Le› er (1981) and Hurwitz and Caves (1988).
6Turning to pro￿tability, we ￿nd that ￿rms bene￿t from DTCA if detailing competition
is not too ￿erce, which is true if detailing investments are su¢ ciently costly. This is true
under both price regulation and price competition, the restriction being less severe in the
latter case. If detailing is not su¢ ciently costly, ￿rms actually prefer a ban on DTCA. This
type of result is not unfamiliar to the advertising literature. Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
arrive at a similar conclusion. There is also empirical evidence that ￿rms can be better o⁄
with restrictions on advertising. For instance, Eckard (1991) found that cigarette companies
bene￿ted from the ban on TV advertising.
Finally, considering welfare we ￿rst show that a regulator in general cannot achieve ￿rst-
best but needs to trade o⁄ the following three ine¢ ciencies: suboptimal DTCA, excessive
detailing, and under-treatment. DTCA is suboptimal due to its public good nature, while
detailing is excessive due to its business-stealing e⁄ect. Second, we ￿nd that the desirability
of DTCA depends on the degree of insurance coverage (the copayment rate), and, if pharma-
ceutical prices are regulated, the strictness of this regulation. In particular, if copayments
are small (and price regulation is lenient), ￿rms compete excessively in terms of detailing.
An allowance of DTCA will in this case amplify detailing competition, and thus lead to a
reduction in welfare. The reverse is true if copayments are high (and price regulation is
strict). We also show that the scope for bene￿cial DTCA increases in the weight on ￿rms￿
pro￿ts. While we assume that medical expenditure as such is welfare neutral, excessive pro-
motional activity arises as an indirect social cost of moral hazard under generous insurance.
In this case a ban on DTCA is warranted.
There are few other theoretical papers on marketing in the pharmaceutical market.13
Rubin and Schrag (1999) analyse the e⁄ect of DTCA on the provision of drugs to their
patients by HMOs. They show that a monopolist supplier of a drug can mitigate the incen-
tive for the HMO to supply a cheaper but less e⁄ective alternative supplied by competitive
￿rms by using DTCA to inform patients about its product. Using a ￿ competitive fringe￿
model, they do not consider competition in terms of advertising and prices. Neither are they
concerned about the role of detailing nor the interaction between the two forms of advertis-
ing, which are key issues of our paper. Konrad (2002) analyses how detailing may distort
13Cabrales (2003) and K￿nigbauer (2004) are two recent theoretical studies of advertising in the context
of generic competition. Since we analyse branded competition, these papers di⁄er from ours.
7prescription choices and lead to mismatching. He models detailing as purely persuasive and
competition as a rent-seeking contest. His work di⁄ers signi￿cantly in that neither DTCA
nor the pricing of drugs are considered.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. In section 3
and 4 we analyse marketing competition in the case of price regulation and price competition,
respectively. Section 5 is devoted to the welfare analysis and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a particular therapeutic market, where a continuum of individuals are distributed
uniformly on the line segment [0;1] with mass 1: Assume all individuals require medical
treatment. The location of an arbitrary patient, x 2 [0;1], is associated with his/her
disease type and/or personal characteristics. There are two pharmaceutical ￿rms, indexed
by i = 0;1, in this market, where ￿rm i sells drug i at a uniform price pi. The drugs are
located at either end of the unit interval, re￿ ecting their (di⁄ering) chemical compounds
and associated treatment e⁄ects.
The surplus (utility) derived by patient x from consuming one unit of drug i is
U (x;i;pi) = v ￿ tjx ￿ ij ￿ ￿pi; (1)
where v > 0; t > 0; and ￿ 2 (0;1]. The parameter v represents the gross "e⁄ectiveness" (or
quality) of drug i. The two drugs have the same gross e⁄ectiveness, but patients vary with
respect to their susceptibility to treatment with the two (chemically) di⁄erentiated drugs.
The parameter t captures the utility loss (￿ mismatch cost￿ ) per unit distance between drug i
and a patient￿ s most suitable drug. The mismatch cost, represented by the term tjx ￿ ij, can
be thought of as re￿ ecting side-e⁄ects, contraindications, etc., that reduce the e⁄ectiveness
of the drug. Finally, the parameter ￿ denotes the copayment rate.14
We assume that patients cannot observe the type of their condition nor the treatment
e⁄ects of the di⁄erent drugs. We let z 2 [0;1] be the fraction of patients that attend the
14Alternatively, we can think of ￿ as a measure of the extent to which physicians take prices into account
when making prescription choices. Generally, ￿ can then be interpreted as a measure of (ex post) moral
hazard.
8physician￿ s practice either because they have developed symptoms of their condition or as
part of a regular check-up. The remaining fraction (1 ￿ z) have the condition but do not
visit the physician as, for instance, they do not have developed strong symptoms (yet).
These individuals are ￿ potential￿consumers of the two drugs.
If allowed by the health authorities, the pharmaceutical ￿rms can advertise directly to
consumers. We assume that DTCA in￿ uences the ￿ potential￿patients￿decision of whether
or not to seek medical advice by a physician. Let ￿i 2 [0;1] denote the fraction of patients
who receive an ad from ￿rm i. We assume that the ads inform the patient about the possible
symptoms that are associated with the condition in question and about the existence of a
drug. Other than that the ads provide no valuable information to the patient. Since all
patients are ill and in need of one of the drugs, we assume that a patient who has seen at
least one ad will visit the physician. Only potential patients who have not been exposed to
an ad do not seek medical advice. This fraction is given by (1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿1). The
fraction of individuals attending a physician for medical advice is then given by:
N (￿0;￿1) = z + (1 ￿ z)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿1)]: (2)
Physicians are ex ante identical and face the same distribution of patients. They have
the skills to identify a patient￿ s type of condition, i.e., the location x 2 [0;1]. Physicians are
perfect agents for the patients, but are assumed to be a priori uninformed about the two
drugs. The relevant information on drug i is (perfectly) provided through the marketing
activities of ￿rm i. For simplicity, we will continue to refer to marketing towards physicians
as detailing. Normalising the number of physicians to one, we denote by ￿i the fraction of
physicians who have been exposed to detailing by ￿rm i. Since detailing is costly, ￿rms are
unable to reach every physician in the market. Thus, there are potentially three types of
physicians in the market: (i) ￿ captive￿physicians who have been detailed by only one of the
￿rms, i.e., ￿i (1 ￿ ￿j); (ii) ￿ selective￿physicians who have been detailed by both ￿rms, i.e.,
￿0￿1; and (iii) ￿ non-prescribing￿(uninformed) physicians who have not been detailed by any
￿rm, i.e., (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿1).
Consider a captive physician who has been exposed to detailing by ￿rm i only. This
physician trades o⁄ drug i against an outside (or no) treatment for every visiting patient.
9More precisely, drug i is prescribed to patient x if the following is true:15
U (x;i;pi) ￿ 0 , v ￿ tjx ￿ ij ￿ ￿pi ￿ 0:
If U (:) < 0, then the physician recommends an outside treatment (e.g., physical exercise) or
no treatment at all (e.g., ￿ just wait until it gets better￿ ). The bene￿t of an outside (or no)
treatment is normalised to zero. Letting e xi denote the patient that is indi⁄erent between








respectively. Thus, physicians who have received information by ￿rm 0 only, prescribe
drug 0 to every visiting patients within the interval [0; e x0]. Likewise, physicians who have
received information by ￿rm 1 only, prescribe drug 1 to every visiting patient within the
interval [1 ￿ e x1;1]: Thus, the captive physicians constitute a monopolistic segment for the
respective ￿rm. Note from (3) that if the copayments become su¢ ciently small relative to
v; then e x0 = 1 and e x1 = 0, implying that every patient will be prescribed a drug. In most
of the analysis we restrict attention to the case of elastic demand, which implies ￿pi > v￿t.
Consider now a selective physician who has been exposed to detailing from both ￿rms.
This physician is fully informed and capable of deciding which drug is the more suitable for
every visiting patient. A selective physician prescribes drug 0 to patient x if the following
is true:
U (x;0;p0) ￿ U (x;1;p1) , v ￿ tx ￿ ￿p0 ￿ v ￿ t(1 ￿ x) ￿ ￿p1:





￿ (p0 ￿ p1)
2t
: (4)
A selective physician would thus prescribe drug 0 to every patient in the interval [0; b x] and
drug 1 to every patient in (b x;1]. As these physicians trade o⁄ the two drugs, the fraction
￿0￿1 constitutes a competitive segment for the two ￿rms. Note that if the copayments are
su¢ ciently high, the two ￿rms become local monopolists. In order to restrict attention to
15There is empirical evidence that physicians do care about patients￿expenditures when deciding which
drug to prescribe (Lundin, 2000). Moreover, Rizzo (1999) estimates that in absence of detailing e⁄ort demand
responds quite elastically to changes in prices.
10the competitive regime, we assume that U (b x;0;p0) = U (1 ￿ b x;1;p1) > 0, which is satis￿ed
if ￿ (p0 + p1)=2 < v ￿ t=2.
From the prescription choices described above, we can now derive the shares of (attend-
ing) patients who receive drug 0 or 1, respectively
M0 = ￿0 [￿1b x + (1 ￿ ￿1) e x0] and M1 = ￿1 [￿0 (1 ￿ b x) + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ e x1)]: (5)
Firm i faces thus the following demand for its drug:
Qi (￿;￿;p) = N (￿) ￿ Mi (￿;p); (6)
where ￿ = (￿0;￿1); ￿ = (￿0;￿1) and p = (p0;p1):
The pharmaceutical ￿rms face identical and constant marginal production costs, which
we normalise to zero. The R&D costs are considered sunk at the time marketing and
price decisions are taking place and play no role in the analysis. Building on the framework
introduced by Butters (1977), we assume that the cost of reaching a fraction ￿i of physicians
and a fraction ￿i of patients is given by the following general advertising cost function,
K (￿i;￿i). The function K (:) is increasing and convex in both detailing and DTCA. As
the two marketing strategies are distinctly di⁄erent, we assume that detailing and DTCA
are separable in the cost function, i.e., @2K=@￿i@￿i = 0. We can now specify ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t
function:
￿i (￿;￿;p) = piQi (￿;￿;p) ￿ K (￿i;￿i): (7)
The following sequence of moves is considered:
￿ Stage 1: The regulator decides on whether or not to allow DTCA.
￿ Stage 2: The pharmaceutical ￿rms determine spending on detailing, and, if allowed,
they set prices and the level of DTCA.
￿ Stage 3: The physician prescribes drug 0, drug 1 or the outside treatment to the
patients.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction.16
16One could argue that marketing is more of a long-term decision than price setting, and should therefore
113 Price regulation
Let us ￿rst examine the ￿rms￿marketing strategies in the absence of price competition.
This captures the situation in most European countries, where prices of prescription drugs
are subject to governmental regulation. Firm 0 maximises (7) with respect to ￿0 and ￿0,
anticipating the number of patients attending the physicians, as given by (2), and the














Firm 1 faces a symmetric problem and a symmetric set of ￿rst-order conditions. We assume
that the regulator imposes the same price on both drugs, i.e., p0 = p1 = p. This is a
reasonable assumption since the drugs/￿rms are fully symmetric. With identical prices, the
physicians will prescribe the two drugs according to:
b x = 1 ￿ b x =
1
2




To simplify exposition let us de￿ne e x =
v￿￿p
t . In the following, we restrict attention to
the case with a competitive region and a monopolistic region with elastic demand, i.e.,
b x < e x < 1. For this to be true, we need to assume the following:




The symmetric detailing and DTCA equilibrium levels are then (implicitly) de￿ned by
be determined at a stage previous of the price game. As this only complicates the analysis without providing
any qualitatively di⁄erent results, we follow Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), and others, by
assuming marketing and price decisions to take place at the same stage of the game.














> (p(1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ ￿1)[(1 ￿ ￿1) e x + ￿1b x])
2
12the following set of equations:18
pN
￿




￿ K￿ (￿r) = 0; (12)
pM (1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ ￿r) ￿ K￿ (￿r) = 0; (13)
where
N = z + (1 ￿ z)
h











The superscript (r) denotes the equilibrium under price regulation. Note that symmetry
allows us to drop the indexing of the variables. For notational convenience, we will use K￿
and K￿ instead of @K=@￿ and @K=@￿, respectively, in the following.
Let us explore the interaction between the two marketing variables. By total di⁄erenti-
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Noting that e x > 1=2, it is easily veri￿ed that DTCA has a positive e⁄ect on detailing. The
intuition is that a higher level of DTCA induces more patient visits. Facing a larger market,
it then becomes more pro￿table for the ￿rms to promote their drugs to the physicians in
order to increase their market share.





p(1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ 2￿) e x + ￿]
pM (1 ￿ z) + K￿￿
> 0 (15)
Noting that (1 ￿ 2￿) e x+￿ > 0 for all valid values, it is easily veri￿ed that the sign is positive.
Thus, a higher level of detailing increases the ￿rms￿incentives to spend money on DTCA. To
understand this recall that physicians who have not been exposed to detailing are unaware of
the available drugs and thus recommend an outside treatment. Low levels of detailing mean
low individual demand for the drugs, which in turn provides weak incentives for the ￿rms to
prompt patient visits via DTCA. We may sum up the results in the following proposition:
18Provided that K￿￿ and K￿￿ are positive and su¢ ciently large the system (12) and (13) has a unique
and stable equilibrium. Also note that ￿ ￿ 1 implies pN ￿ 2K￿ (1):
13Proposition 1 DTCA and detailing are complementary marketing strategies for the ￿rms
in the case of price regulation.
Thus, our model predicts that allowing DTCA would lead to more detailing. Vice versa,
a stricter regulation of detailing would reduce ￿rms￿spending on DTCA. Empirical evidence
suggests a positive relationship between DTCA and detailing. In the US, DTCA was lib-
eralised in 1997. Based on US marketing data, Rosenthal et al. (2002) ￿nd that spending
on DTCA for prescription drugs tripled between 1996 and 2000. For the same period pro-
motional spending to physicians also increased (except for journal advertising). Our model
provides an intuition for a positive correlation between the two marketing strategies.
Consider now the industry-maximising (or cooperative) marketing levels. The pro￿t
function under symmetry is given by:
￿ (￿;￿) = pN (￿)M (￿) ￿ K (￿;￿): (16)
Maximising this with respect to ￿ and ￿ gives us the optimal levels of marketing at the
industry level, as de￿ned by the following set of ￿rst-order conditions:
@￿
@￿
= pN [(1 ￿ ￿) e x + (1 ￿ e x)￿] ￿ K￿ = 0; (17)
@￿
@￿
= 2pM (1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ K￿ = 0: (18)
Comparing the industry-maximising marketing levels with the duopoly marketing levels,
provides the following result.
Lemma 1 Firms overinvest in detailing and underinvest in DTCA from an industry per-
spective under price regulation.
Proof. The result follows by direct inspection, when comparing (12) with (17), while
observing (1 ￿ e x) < 1
2; and (13) with (18).
The Lemma states that if ￿rms could coordinate their marketing investments, they would
choose a lower level of detailing and a higher level of DTCA. Basically, this results from
the fact that DTCA is purely market-expanding, while detailing contains elements of both
market expansion and business-stealing. Since DTCA induces patients to visit a physician,
14but does not a⁄ect the choice of drug, there is an incentive for the ￿rms to free-ride on each
other. Because of the positive spillover it is hardly surprising that ￿rms tend to underinvest
in DTCA.
In contrast to DTCA, detailing tends to shift market shares between the duopolists
and the ￿ outside treatment￿ , and amongst the duopolists themselves. On the one hand,
by providing information to some previously uninformed physicians detailing by, say, ￿rm
0 contributes towards expanding the market share of drug 0 at the expense of the outside
treatment. This leaves the rival ￿rm 1 una⁄ected. On the other hand, however, by informing
physicians who were previously informed about drug 1 only, detailing by ￿rm 0 also shifts
demand from ￿rm 1￿ s monopolistic segment into the competitive segment. This form of
business stealing constitutes a negative externality and, thus, implies over-investment.
Let us turn to the issue of whether or not ￿rms bene￿t from the availability of DTCA.
The criterion for DTCA to be pro￿table for the ￿rms is given by the following condition:
￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿r;￿r) ￿ ￿ (￿r j￿=0 ;0) > 0; (19)
In general, the value of higher demand due to DTCA must be higher than the net increase
in marketing costs. Evaluating (19) for equilibrium detailing and DTCA, we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 2 DTCA unambiguously increases ￿rms￿pro￿ts if the detailing costs are suf-




e x ￿ 1=2
e x ￿ ￿(e x ￿ 1=2)
2 (0;1).
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A proof is provided in the Appendix.
19To examine the condition in the proposition, consider the following class of cost functions: K (￿) = ￿￿
￿;






> 1 i⁄ ￿ > 1 + ￿:
Thus, ￿rms bene￿t from DTCA for any detailing cost function with a convexity higher than 1 + ￿, which is
a very mild condition, taking into account that ￿ at maximum is equal to 1:
15At ￿rst glance it may seem strange that ￿rms should bene￿t from DTCA only when the
detailing cost function is su¢ ciently convex, especially since DTCA triggers higher levels of
detailing. The intuition is, however, closely linked to a strategic e⁄ect of a costly detailing
technology. When detailing costs are very convex, ￿rms spend little on detailing. At low
levels of detailing the monopolistic segment of the market is relatively large compared with
the competitive segment. Thus, competition is softened by a costly detailing technology. In
this case, the direct market-expanding e⁄ect of DTCA dominates the (indirect) sti⁄ening
of detailing competition, and DTCA is bene￿cial to the ￿rms.
This type of result is not unfamiliar to the advertising literature, and has been identi￿ed
by, for instance, Grossman and Shapiro (1984). They demonstrate that a more costly
advertising technology has two countervailing e⁄ects on pro￿ts. First, there is the obvious
direct negative cost e⁄ect. Second, and more interesting, there is a strategic positive e⁄ect,
namely that a costly advertising technology limits the size of the competitive segment. There
are clear parallels between these results.
Finally, let us take a brief look at the comparative statics. We see from (12) and (13)
that detailing and DTCA are increasing in v, while decreasing in t and ￿. Taking into
account the complementarity between the two marketing strategies, then, obviously, v; t
and ￿ have the same qualitative e⁄ects in equilibrium. Quantitatively the e⁄ects are in fact
ampli￿ed due to the positive interaction between the two marketing strategies. For instance,
the negative e⁄ect of a higher mismatch cost, t, on detailing is reinforced in the presence of
DTCA.
The e⁄ects of p and z are more complex. Instead of deriving the comparative statics
analytically, we use numerical illustrations, which ease the presentation of the intuition.20
We will for this part assume that the advertising cost function takes the following form:




. Although we restrict ourselves to a relatively small set of numerical
examples, several regularities can be identi￿ed that shed some light on the mechanisms of
the model.
Consider ￿rst the e⁄ects of an increase in the fraction of regular patients (z). A higher
z increases detailing as the number of patient visits grows. However, a higher z also re-
20Interested readers can contact the authors for the analytical derivation of the comparative statics.
16duces DTCA as the "potential" market shrinks. Since lower DTCA reduces the number of
attending patients, this has a negative indirect e⁄ect on detailing. Thus, the net e⁄ect of a
change in z is ambiguous in general. Table 1 provides a numerical illustration of the e⁄ects
of z.
Table 1: Comparative statics w.r.t. z
z ￿r ￿r Mr Nr ￿r
0:0 0:645 0:396 0:437 0:635 0:130
0:2 0:661 0:347 0:443 0:659 0:159
0:4 0:686 0:289 0:451 0:696 0:194
0:6 0:723 0:217 0:462 0:755 0:238
0:8 0:777 0:125 0:475 0:847 0:294
1:0 0:857 0:0 0:490 1:0 0:367
Assumptions: v = 1:75;t = 1;￿ = 0:5;p = 1:5
From the table we see that detailing is increasing, while DTCA is decreasing, in the level
of z. Thus, the direct e⁄ect dominates the indirect complementarity e⁄ect for the speci￿c
parameter values chosen.21 This is in line with the empirical ￿ndings by Iizuka (2004).
Moreover, we see that each ￿rm￿ s market share, M, increases in z. Since the demand in
the monopolistic segment is ￿xed (e x = 0:75), the increase in the ￿rms￿market shares follow
directly from the increase in detailing due to a change in z. The number of patients visiting
the physicians, N, is also increasing in z, despite the fact that DTCA is reduced. Since
DTCA attracts ￿ potential￿patients only with a probability, this can never exceed the direct
e⁄ect of one more ￿ regular￿patient with certainty. Finally, we see that pro￿ts are increasing
in z:
The e⁄ects of an increase in the regulated price (p), too, are subject to countervailing
forces. On the one hand, a higher p increases the revenues from every patient buying the
product, boosting the incentives for both detailing and DTCA. On the other hand, a higher
p lowers demand in the monopolistic segment, as drug consumption now becomes more
21It is possible to show that the direct e⁄ect dominates the indirect e⁄ect for a wide set of parameter
values. The exception is when the copayment rate ￿ is very low.
17expensive. Table 2 provides a numerical illustration.
Table 2: Comparative statics w.r.t. p
p ￿r ￿r e xr Mr Nr ￿r
1:5 0:703 0:255 1:0 0:456 0:722 0:015
1:7 0:752 0:277 0:9 0:451 0:739 0:051
1:9 0:802 0:299 0:8 0:449 0:754 0:093
2:1 0:856 0:322 0:7 0:453 0:770 0:143
2:3 0:921 0:350 0:6 0:468 0:789 0:213
2:4 0:963 0:367 0:55 0:483 0:800 0:397
Assumptions: v = 1:75;t = 1;z = 0:5;￿ = 0:5
As expected the demand in the monopolistic segment, e x, drops as the price increases.
Despite the "demand-reducing" e⁄ect, both detailing and DTCA are increasing in p. This
means that the direct positive e⁄ect of a higher price dominates the negative demand e⁄ect
for the set of parameter values considered in Table 2.22 Moreover, we see that the number
of patient visits, N, increases in p, which follows straightforwardly from the e⁄ect of price
on DTCA. The e⁄ect on market shares, M, is more complicated, though. At low price
levels M is decreasing in p, while at high price levels M is increasing in p. Basically, this is
the net result of changes in e x and ￿r due to price increases. Finally, we see that the ￿rms
bene￿t from price increases, implying that the net revenue e⁄ect of a higher price more than
o⁄sets the increase in marketing costs. However, since pro￿ts in general are concave in p,
the reverse will be true at higher price levels.
4 Price competition
Let us now consider the case where the Health Authority allows the pharmaceutical ￿rms
to set the prices of their products. This situation is relevant for some markets, in particular
22It is possible to show that the "mark-up" e⁄ect dominates the "reduced-demand" e⁄ect for almost every
valid set of parameter values. The exception is when the copayment rate is very high.
18the US.23 At stage two of the game, ￿rm 0 maximises (7) with respect to ￿0; ￿0 and
p0; anticipating the number of patients attending the physicians, as given by (2), and the
physicians￿prescription choices, as given by (5). The solution to this problem is de￿ned by
the set of ￿rst-order conditions consisting of (8), (9), and
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Firm 1 faces a symmetric problem and a symmetric set of ￿rst-order conditions. We therefore
impose symmetry in order to derive the equilibrium. Under symmetry we know that the
physicians would prescribe according to (10). Inserting this into (20) and solving for p, we
￿nd the equilibrium price to be (implicitly) given by
pc =
2v (1 ￿ ￿) + t￿
￿ (4 ￿ 3￿)
; (21)
with the superscript (c) denoting the price competition regime. Thus, the symmetric equilib-
rium under price competition is de￿ned by (12), (13) and (21).24;25 Inserting (21) into (10),




and e xc =
2v ￿ ￿(v + t)
t(4 ￿ 3￿)
; (22)
respectively. The restriction securing an equilibrium with a competitive region and an elastic
monopolistic region, i.e., b x < e x < 1, is now given by
t(4 ￿ ￿)
2(2 ￿ ￿)











Thus, the gross e⁄ectiveness (or quality) of the drug, v, must neither be too large nor too
small relative to the mismatch cost, t. We assume (23) to hold in the following.
23The German market, too, used to exhibit relatively free pricing. However, this has changed after recent
reforms, where reference pricing is now being practiced.
24Provided that K￿￿ and K￿￿ are positive and su¢ ciently large the system (12), (13) and (21) has a
unique and stable equilibrium. Here, ￿
c ￿ 1 implies 2K￿ (1) ￿
Nt
￿ or, equivalently, ￿ ￿
Nt
2K￿(1):
25In their well-known contribution Dorfman and Steiner (1954) show that the advertising to sales ratio
equals the ratio of the advertising and price elasticity. As a referee has pointed out to us, similar rules can be
derived for our model that describe the relationship between expenditure on detailing and DTCA in relation
to each other and in relation to sales revenue. The exact conditions can be provided upon request.
19Only detailing has a direct e⁄ect on the equilibrium price. The price depends on DTCA
only indirectly via the e⁄ect of DTCA on detailing. The same holds for the demand in
the monopolistic segment as de￿ned by e xc. The reason is that DTCA does not a⁄ect the
physicians￿prescription choices, which in turn determine the price elasticity of demand.





￿ (4 ￿ 3￿)






2 < 0: (24)
Thus, a higher level of detailing increases the equilibrium price and thus decreases the
demand in the monopolistic segment. As a consequence, the e⁄ect of more detailing on
each ￿rm￿ s market share, as given by M, now becomes ambiguous. Inserting (22) into (5)
and di⁄erentiating the resulting expression with respect to detailing, while observing the




8v + 8t￿ ￿ 24v￿ + 21v￿2 ￿ 9t￿2 + 3t￿3 ￿ 6v￿3
t(4 ￿ 3￿)
2 > 0:
Thus, the direct positive e⁄ect of detailing on market shares more than o⁄sets the indirect
negative price e⁄ect. We can summarise as follows:
Lemma 2 (i) Detailing increases the equilibrium price. (ii) Detailing lowers demand in
the monopolistic segment, but increases overall demand.
The e⁄ect on price of detailing is interesting for the following two reasons. First, it
runs counter to other theoretical ￿ndings using an informative advertising framework. For
instance, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) show that informative advertising leads to lower
prices. The argument is that advertising increases the fraction of fully informed buyers,
i.e., the competitive segment, and this triggers price competition. Our model resembles the
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model. The basic di⁄erence between the two models is that
we assume elastic demand in the monopolistic segment, while they assume inelastic demand
in this segment.26 Thus, in our model a ￿rm faces two e⁄ects of lowering its price: (i) it
steals some consumers from the rival in the competitive segment; and (ii) it increases the
demand in the monopolistic segment. In Grossman and Shapiro (1984) only the ￿rst e⁄ect
26Formally, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) assume that the partially informed fractions, i.e., ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿1)
and ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿0); purchase the product at any price p0 and p1, implying that e x0 = 1 ￿ e x1 = 1.
20is present. Interestingly, it turns out that this assumption qualitatively changes the e⁄ect
of marketing upon prices.
Second, the e⁄ect of prices is consistent with empirical ￿ndings. Considering competi-
tion between branded drugs, Rizzo (1999) ￿nds that advertising, or detailing more precisely,
makes demand less elastic to prices, and thus leads to higher prices. This result is then inter-
preted as drug marketing being persuasive rather than informative. Our model demonstrates
that even informative advertising might lead to higher prices, given that demand in the mo-
nopolistic segment is su¢ ciently elastic. Thus, the issue of persuasive versus informative
drug marketing is unresolved.
Let us now examine the interaction between the ￿rms￿strategies. We know from (14)
and (15) that detailing and DTCA are complementary strategies. This is true for any
positive price, and thus also true for the equilibrium price under price competition. The
issue now is to analyse the interaction between price and the two marketing strategies. By


































pM (1 ￿ z) + K￿￿
: (26)
Evaluating (25) and (26) for the equilibrium price level, given by (21), we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 3 Detailing, DTCA and price are complementary strategies for the ￿rms in
the case of price competition.
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
As discussed previously, a higher price has two opposing e⁄ects: First, it increases the
revenues per drug sold. Second, it lowers demand (in the monopolistic segment). The
proposition states that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates, so that a higher price actually has a
positive impact on both detailing and DTCA. As a consequence, the availability of price
as a strategic variable ampli￿es the complementarity between the two marketing strategies.
Compared with the price regulation case, a higher level of detailing not only increases
21DTCA but also prices. Moreover, higher prices have a positive feedback on both detailing
and DTCA. Thus, there is a complementarity between all strategic variables.
Under price regulation we showed that ￿rms tend to overinvest in detailing and under-
invest in DTCA from an industry perspective (cf. Lemma 1). This result carries over to the
case of price competition, where it can be shown that (as expected) ￿rms set a price that is
below the one they would choose cooperatively.
Let us now examine whether or not ￿rms bene￿t from the availability of DTCA under
price competition. As for the price regulation case, the criteria for DTCA to be pro￿table
for the ￿rms is determined by the di⁄erence in equilibrium pro￿ts with and without DTCA,
as de￿ned by (19). Taking into account the equilibrium price, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 (i) DTCA unambiguously increases ￿rms￿pro￿ts if the detailing costs are









e x ￿ ￿(e x ￿ 1=2)
2 (0;1).
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(ii) Under price competition DTCA is pro￿table for a wider range of parameters than
in the case of price regulation.
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
Recall from Proposition 2 that ￿rms bene￿t from DTCA if the detailing cost function
is su¢ ciently convex. This result was derived for any price, including the equilibrium price
under price competition. The above proposition demonstrates that price competition relaxes
this condition.28 As more detailing tends to allow the ￿rms to charge a higher equilibrium
price, the problem of over-investment into detailing is now less pronounced. The sti⁄ening
of detailing competition when DTCA is allowed is then "less costly" to the ￿rms, and DTCA
tends to be more pro￿table than under price regulation.
The comparative statics are further complicated under price competition as now the
price, too, is a⁄ected by changes in the parameters. However, the e⁄ects of v and ￿ are still
27As for the price regulation case, this condition is not very strict. Firms bene￿t from DTCA for any




22straightforward. From (21), (8) and (9) we see that a higher v increases the equilibrium
price, detailing and DTCA. Conversely, a higher co-payment ￿ increases the price elasticity
of demand and therefore curbs the equilibrium price and marketing.
The complicated e⁄ects are thus associated with the parameters t and z. It can easily
be shown that the comparative statics with respect to z are qualitatively the same as for
the price regulation case except for the fact that prices are usually increasing in z.29 The
reason for this is the interaction with detailing. A higher z leads to more detailing, which
in turn has a positive e⁄ect on prices.
Turning to the comparative statics with respect to t, recall that under price regulation a
higher t implied less detailing and less DTCA. The reason is that a higher t reduces demand
from the monopolistic segment. While the demand-reducing e⁄ect is still present under
price competition, this e⁄ect is now counteracted by a positive impact on price of t. More
di⁄erentiated drugs enable the ￿rms to set higher prices, as is readily veri￿ed from (21).
Thus, it is not clear whether a higher t leads to more or less marketing and, in turn, to
higher or lower pro￿ts. Table 3 below illustrates the relationship.
Table 3: Comparative statics with respect to t
t pc ￿c ￿c e xc Mc Nc ￿c
0:875 1:750 0:7935 0:2952 1:000 0:4787 0:7517 0:2713
0:900 1:775 0:7933 0:2951 0:959 0:4719 0:7516 0:2711
0:925 1:799 0:7933 0:2951 0:920 0:4654 0:7515 0:2711
0:950 1:824 0:7935 0:2952 0:882 0:4594 0:7516 0:2713
0:975 1:848 0:7940 0:2954 0:847 0:4538 0:7518 0:2716
1:000 1:873 0:7949 0:2958 0:814 0:4486 0:7521 0:2722
1:250 2:179 0:8425 0:3165 0:528 0:4250 0:7664 0:3048
Assumptions: v = 1:75;z = 0:5;￿ = 0:5:
As expected, the equilibrium price unambiguously increases in t. Moreover, a higher
price and a higher t both contribute to a lower demand in the monopolistic segment, as
given by e x in the table. However, the e⁄ects of t on the two marketing strategies are
29For some low ￿; p
c is convex in z:
23ambiguous. At low levels of t, both detailing and DTCA are decreasing due to a marginal
increase in t. Contrary, at high levels, the marginal e⁄ect of t is positive. The reason is
that the demand-reducing e⁄ect of t dominates the price-increasing e⁄ect for low levels of
t, while the opposite is true for high levels of t. This also explains the e⁄ect on pro￿ts of
changes in t .
5 Welfare and policy implications
In this section we analyse welfare and policy implications of DTCA. First, we characterise the
social optimum (￿rst-best) and compare this with the price regulation and price competition
equilibria derived in the previous sections. Second, we analyse the desirability of DTCA
using two di⁄erent measures: (i) a standard (unweighted) welfare function; and (ii) consumer
surplus net of medical expenditures. The second measure is equivalent to putting a zero
weight on ￿rms￿pro￿ts. We believe this measure captures the objective of countries with
insigni￿cant R&D and production of pharmaceuticals.
Let us start by specifying the consumer surplus. The total number of patients is nor-
malised to 1, of which a fraction N 2 [0;1]; as given by (2), visits a physician. Patients￿
utility depend on the physicians￿prescribing choice. The fraction of selective physicians,
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Selective physicians contribute to consumer surplus by improving the matching of drugs to
patients with di⁄erent types of illnesses. Thus, C measures the social bene￿t of detailing
due to improved matching.
The fraction of captive physicians, i.e., ￿i (1 ￿ ￿j), trades o⁄ the drug they are aware
of against an outside treatment (or no treatment), creating the following surplus for their
patients:
D = ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿1)
Z e x0
0
(v ￿ ￿p0 ￿ ty)dy + ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿0)
Z 1
1￿e x1
(v ￿ ￿p1 ￿ t(1 ￿ y))dy;(28)
= ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿1)
￿
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24Captive physicians make a prescription to every visiting patient who are better o⁄ with
a drug treatment than an outside treatment. Thus, D measures the social bene￿t of de-
tailing in terms of reduced under-treatment of patients with this particular illness. Finally,
non-prescribing (uninformed) physicians recommend an outside treatment to their patients.
Having normalised the bene￿t of the outside treatment to zero, total consumer surplus is,
thus, given by:
CS = N ￿ [C + D]: (29)
It is easily veri￿ed that gross consumer surplus (i.e., CS+￿p0Q0+￿p1Q1) is unambiguously
increasing in both detailing and DTCA. However, from the previous sections, we know that
the copayment rate and prices a⁄ect the marketing levels, implying countervailing e⁄ects
on net consumer surplus, i.e., CS. Section 5.2 below deals in detail with this issue, focusing
on the bene￿t of allowing DTCA.
5.1 First best
Welfare is de￿ned as the consumers￿surplus and ￿rms￿pro￿ts (producers￿surplus) net of
third-party payments. Collecting terms, the welfare function can be written as:30
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The social planner￿ s problem is to maximise (30) with respect to b x; e xi; ￿i and ￿i. The
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30In a ￿rst-best world the social planner has access to lump-sum transfers. Thus, in deriving ￿rst-best we
ignore distortionary e⁄ects associated with the third-party payments. In a second-best world, however, this
is likely to be an argument.
25@W
@￿i













b x2 + (1 ￿ b x)
2
￿￿















From (31) the socially optimal prescription choice by selective physicians implies b xfb = 1=2,
which is the choice that minimises the mismatch costs. As this is also the equilibrium
prescription choice, there is no social loss associated with the selective physicians. Moreover,
from (32) we derive the ￿rst-best prescription choice by captive physicians:
e x
fb







t if v < t
1 if v ￿ t
:
Thus, we have two candidates for ￿rst-best. If the e⁄ectiveness of the drug is su¢ ciently
small, i.e., if v < t, the patients with the highest mismatch costs ("longest distance")
should not receive a prescription, as they would get negative utility from the treatment.
On the other hand, if the e⁄ectiveness of the drug is su¢ ciently large, i.e., if v ￿ t, it is
socially optimal that every visiting patient receive a drug prescription. However, under price
competition we know from (23) that v must be weakly larger than t for the equilibrium to be
well-de￿ned. Thus, in the following we assume v ￿ t, implying that e x
fb
i = 1 is the relevant
candidate. Given this assumption, we can from (33) and (34) derive ￿rst-best detailing and
DTCA:

































In general, detailing and DTCA can be both excessive and suboptimal when compared
with the ￿rst-best.31 The reason is that equilibrium detailing and DTCA are decreasing in
the copayment rate (and increasing in price for the regulation case). Thus, for su¢ ciently
low copayments (and/or su¢ ciently high regulated prices), excessive marketing occurs, and
vice versa. A comparison of (35) and (36) with equilibrium detailing and DTCA provides,
however, a more interesting result.
31A full characterisation of the comparison of ￿rst-best against equilibrium marketing has been carried
out, and can be provided by the authors upon request.
26Proposition 5 First-best is in general not achievable via price and/or co-payment regu-
lation. In particular, ￿rst-best detailing implies suboptimal DTCA, and ￿rst-best DTCA
implies excessive detailing. In either case, under-treatment (under-diagnosing) occurs.
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
Optimal price regulation and insurance policy are clearly outside the scope of this pa-
per.32 However, the proposition contains some policy implications relevant for this industry
given the scale at which marketing activity takes place. In the price competition case, there
is one instrument, ￿, to induce socially optimal levels of three variables, ￿; ￿ and e x. Assume
that ￿ (or p) is set so that ￿rms￿invest socially optimal in detailing, which is true for a
relatively high copayment. In this case, DTCA will be suboptimal due to its strong public
good character. Vice versa, if ￿ is set so that DTCA is socially optimal, which is true for a
relatively low copayment rate, then detailing is excessive due to its business-stealing e⁄ect.
In the price regulation case, there are two instruments, ￿ and p, that can induce socially
optimal levels of the three variables, ￿; ￿ and e x. However, since these instruments have
the same directional e⁄ect on both marketing strategies, it follows that in general ￿rst-best
cannot be achieved.
5.2 The welfare e⁄ects of DTCA
To analyse the desirability of DTCA, we use two di⁄erent welfare measures: (i) the (un-
weighted) sum of consumer surplus and pro￿t net of third party transfers; and (ii) consumer
surplus net of medical expenditures, consisting of copayments and third party payments.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no social costs associated with the third party trans-
fers.33 Imposing symmetry, and collecting terms, we can write the social welfare function
32Price regulation is mainly concerned with the trade-o⁄ between R&D and cost containment, while
insurance is concerned with moral hazard and adverse selection problems. As our purpose is a very di⁄erent
one, second-best policy is beyond the scope of this paper.
33In practice, third-party transfers are typically funded by taxation or social insurance which has dis-
tortionary e⁄ects on labour supply and possibly consumption. Since the e⁄ect of this social cost is rather
straightforward, and since we want to focus on the existing parameters in our model, we do not pursue this
issue.
27as
W (p;￿;￿) = CS + 2￿ ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)Q














￿ 2K (￿;￿): (37)
We see that the ￿rst welfare measure simpli￿es to (gross) consumer surplus net of ￿rms￿
marketing expenditures. Note that the copayment rate and the prices matter for welfare
as they a⁄ect the number of patients ending up with a drug prescription. Thus, prices are
not welfare neutral transfers between the agents in our model, but involve a traditional
deadweight loss.
The criterion for (equilibrium) DTCA to be socially bene￿cial is that welfare is higher








pk j￿=0 ;￿k j￿=0 ;0
￿
> 0; where k = r;c: (38)
In general, DTCA is desirable only if its positive e⁄ect on consumer surplus exceeds the
increase in marketing expenditure.
The second welfare measure is the consumer surplus net of medical expenditure. Impos-
ing symmetry, and collecting terms, we can write this measure as follows:
￿(p;￿;￿) = CS ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)Q















Note that this welfare measure is equivalent to putting a zero weight on ￿rms￿pro￿ts. As
a consequence, marketing outlays are completely ignored, while total medical expenditure
plays an important role. The criterion for DTCA to be desirable, using (39) as a measure,







pk j￿=0 ;￿k j￿=0 ;0
￿
> 0; where k = r;c: (40)
According to this measure, DTCA should be allowed if the improvements in gross consumer
surplus exceed the increase in medical expenditures following a liberalisation of DTCA.
An analytical approach to the comparison of welfare levels with and without DTCA
proves to be intractable. We therefore resort to numerical analysis. As for the previous nu-





28Consider ￿rst the case of price regulation. In terms of welfare and policy implications,
the key parameters under price regulation are the regulated price p and the copayment rate
￿.34 In Table 4, we evaluate the welfare e⁄ect of DTCA, as given by (38), for di⁄erent levels
of p and ￿.35
Table 4: The e⁄ect of DTCA on W under price regulation
￿=p 1:4 1:6 1:8 2:0 2:2 2:4
0:35 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:033 ￿0:003
0:45 ￿ ￿ 0:091 0:066 0:036 ￿0:003
0:55 0:122 0:109 0:091 0:071 0:046 ￿
0:65 0:112 0:100 0:086 ￿ ￿ ￿
0:75 0:096 0:082 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0:85 0:073 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Assumptions: v = 1:75, t = 1; z = 0:5:
The table illustrates that DTCA is likely to be welfare improving, i.e., ￿W > 0, for
a wide range of combinations of prices and copayment rates. The exception is when the
regulated price becomes very high.36 In this case, equilibrium detailing, and possibly DTCA,
are excessive, implying that the increase in consumer surplus due to DTCA is more than
o⁄set by the increase in aggregate marketing expenditures. The e⁄ect of the copayment
is less clear. At high price levels, a higher copayment is likely to improve the net welfare
bene￿t from DTCA, while at low price levels the opposite is true. The intuition is closely
linked to whether marketing is suboptimal or excessive. At low price levels, DTCA, and
possibly detailing, are suboptimal. A reduction of the copayment rate in this case, increases
34Numerous numerical exercises of the other parameters, i.e., v; t and z; have been carried out for both the
price regulation and the price competition case. However, since the choice of whether or not to allow DTCA
is likely to apply for all illnesses - and not for speci￿c treatments depending on the levels of v, t and z - we
have left these analysis out of the paper. The numerical results can, however, be provided upon request.
35The empty cells corresponds to combinations for p and ￿ where e x = 2 (1=2;1].
36Notably, the pattern with respect to ￿ and p reported in Tables 4 and 5 emerges for a wide set of values
of v, t and z.
29the incentives for marketing, resulting in a net welfare improvement. At high price levels,
the opposite is true.
Turning to the second welfare measure - consumer surplus net of medical expenditures
- we provide in Table 5 a numerical evaluation of (40) for di⁄erent values of p and ￿.
Table 5: The e⁄ect of DTCA on ￿ under price regulation
￿=p 1:4 1:6 1:8 2:0 2:2 2:4
0:35 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:208 ￿0:288
0:45 ￿ ￿ ￿0:091 ￿0:157 ￿0:243 ￿0:363
0:55 0:008 ￿0:034 ￿0:088 ￿0:159 ￿0:261 ￿
0:65 0:010 ￿0:028 ￿0:074 ￿ ￿ ￿
0:75 0:011 ￿0:018 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0:85 0:011 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Assumptions: v = 1:75;t = 1;z = 0:5
The table shows that DTCA is less likely to be bene￿cial using the second welfare mea-
sure. In fact, DTCA is bene￿cial only if the regulated price is very low. As for the previous
case, a higher price level reduces the bene￿t of DTCA. A high price level directly increases
medical expenditures. It also indirectly a⁄ects the medical expenditures by increasing de-
tailing and thus the number of prescriptions. Thus, allowing DTCA in this case induces a
large increase in medical expenditures and a moderate increase in gross consumer surplus,
resulting in a negative ￿￿.
The copayment e⁄ect is more complicated. Contrary to the previous case in Table 4, the
bene￿t of DTCA is increasing in the copayment rate for low price levels, while the opposite
is true for high price levels. To understand this note that the copayment rate just de￿nes
the cost sharing between the third-party payer and the consumer (patient). Thus, a higher
copayment has no direct e⁄ect on medical expenditures. Indirectly, howenver, by its impact
on e x, the copayment a⁄ects the number of prescriptions and in turn medical expenditure.
At low prices and high copayments, ￿rms￿detailing activity is very low, and so is consumer
surplus. Allowing DTCA in this case increases (gross) consumer surplus substantially, while
the e⁄ect on medical expenditures is moderate, resulting in a higher ￿￿.
30We believe the observed patterns in Table 4 and 5 can explain the empirical fact that
most countries with insigni￿cant R&D and production of pharmaceuticals practice strict
regulation on drug marketing, especially on DTCA. The reason is that these countries are
likely to be concerned about consumers￿surplus and medical expenditures, and not about
(foreign) ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
Turning to the case of price competition, the key parameter in terms of welfare and
policy implications is the copayment rate ￿. In Table 6 we have evaluated (38) and (40) for
di⁄erent levels of ￿.37
Table 6: Welfare e⁄ects of DTCA under price competition
￿ 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
￿W ￿0:049 0:074 0:106 0:108 0:099 0:087
￿￿ ￿0:449 ￿0:130 ￿0:022 0:023 0:041 0:046
Assumptions: v = 1:75;t = 1;z = 0:5
The table shows that the e⁄ect of DTCA on the two welfare measures are somewhat
di⁄erent under price competition than under price regulation. DTCA is likely to be bene￿cial
to welfare only if the copayment rate is su¢ ciently high. Regarding consumer surplus net
of medical expenditures, we ￿nd that ￿￿ unambigiously increases in the copayment rate,
implying that the net bene￿t of DTCA tends to be greater for high levels of co-insurance.
The reason is that a low copayment rate induces high prices and substantial marketing. More
intensive marketing increase gross consumer surplus by improving the matching (detailing)
and by reducing the level of under-treatment (DTCA and detailing). However, a lower
copayment rate also leads to higher medical expenditures, directly by increasing the prices,
and indirectly by increasing marketing and in turn demand. In fact, when the copayment
rate becomes su¢ ciently small, the medical expenditure e⁄ect starts to dominating the
improvements to consumers￿surplus. Allowing DTCA in this situation is detrimental to
welfare.
The e⁄ect of DTCA on consumer surplus net of marketing expenditures, ￿W, is di⁄er-
ent. At high copayment levels, DTCA tends to be welfare improving, while at low copayment
37The pattern reported in Table 6 holds for a wide set of parameter values of v; t and z.
31levels the opposite is true. The explanation is, as for the price regulation case, linked to
marketing being excessive or suboptimal. At low copayment rates, prices are high and mar-
keting, especially detailing, is potentially excessive. A further reduction of the copayment
rate is in this case likely to lead to substantial increases in aggregate marketing expendi-
tures, whilst the increase in consumers￿surplus is modest. At high copayment rates, the
intuition is the opposite. In this case prices are low and marketing, especially DTCA, is
potentially suboptimal. An increase in the copayment rate in this case is likely to improve
welfare, as the increase in total marketing expenditures is modest, whilst the improvements
to the patients are substantial.
We conclude this section with a comparison of the welfare e⁄ects of DTCA in the case
of price regulation as opposed to price competition. In order to establish a benchmark, we
assume that the regulated price is ￿xed at the level of the duopoly price in the absence of
DTCA, i.e., p = pcj￿=0 : The net e⁄ect of DTCA on the two welfare measures, W and ￿,
can then be calculated for di⁄erent levels of the co-payment ￿, as given in Table 7.
Table 7: Welfare e⁄ects of DTCA: competition vs. regulation
￿ 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
￿W 0:016 0:009 0:112 0:111 0:101 0:088
￿￿ 0:204 0:169 0:104 0:071 0:057 0:005
Assumptions: v = 1:75;t = 1;z = 0:5
Comparing Table 7 with Table 6, it is evident that the net bene￿t of DTCA on either
welfare measure is always greater under price regulation than under price competition.
The reason is, of course, that price regulation eliminates the welfare loss arising from an
increase in the market price under DTCA. While the co-payment has a similar impact on
the net bene￿t of DTCA in the case of the utilitarian welfare, W, a strikingly di⁄erent
pattern emerges when we use consumer surplus net of medical expenditures, ￿, as our
welfare measure. Here, under price regulation, the net bene￿t of DTCA decreases rather
than increases with the co-payment. Since prices do not increase, the net welfare loss due to
greater moral hazard under DTCA is eliminated. However, then a greater co-payment tends
to imply a lower share of patients to whom the drug is prescribed. This in turn reduces the
social returns to DTCA.
326 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the e⁄ects of DTCA in the prescription drug market. Espe-
cially, we have been concerned with the e⁄ect of DTCA on ￿rms￿pro￿ts and social welfare.
Building on the informative advertising models developed by Butters (1977), Grossman
and Shapiro (1984), among others, we have focused on the interaction between consumer-
oriented (DTCA) and physician-oriented (detailing) marketing. We have studied both the
case with and the case without price regulation, and have taken account of variations in
copayments.
Regarding the pro￿tability of DTCA, we report the following three ￿ndings: First,
DTCA, detailing and price (if not regulated) are complementary strategies for the ￿rms.
Thus, allowing DTCA is prone to increase the spending on detailing and rise prices. Second,
￿rms tend to overinvest in detailing and underinvest in DTCA from an industry perspec-
tive. This is due to the market-expanding nature of DTCA and the business-stealing nature
of detailing. Third, we show that ￿rms bene￿t from DTCA if the detailing technology is
su¢ ciently costly. Otherwise, ￿rms compete excessively in terms of detailing, implying that
the use of DTCA will induce even more excessive detailing. In this case ￿rms prefer a ban
on DTCA.
Turning to welfare, we establish the following results: First, we show that both DTCA
and detailing can be excessive or suboptimal depending on the copayment. Generally, ￿rst-
best cannot be achieved, and the regulator must trade o⁄suboptimal levels of DTCA against
excessive levels of detailing. Second, we ￿nd that the impact of DTCA on welfare is generally
ambiguous, and, in particular, depends on the copayment rate and the price (if regulated).
Under generous insurance and/or lenient price regulation, DTCA is detrimental to welfare.
Moreover, if the regulator is not concerned about ￿rms￿pro￿ts, but just about consumer
surplus net of medical expenditures, then DTCA is more likely to be banned.
The model is closely linked to empirical ￿ndings and stylised facts of marketing in the
prescription drug market. In this sense it contributes to explaining and interpreting the
empirical ￿ndings. It also contributes to the theoretical literature, not only by ￿lling the
gap with respect to DTCA, but also by extending the basic model of advertising to involve
two marketing strategies.
33Let us, however, highlight some issues. It has been argued that DTCA may prompt
unnecessary visits, and that such visits cause physicians to waste valuable time, and may
result in unnecessary medication. In our model, some patients are actually better o⁄ with
an outside (or no) treatment. By attaching a cost to physician visits, we could in principle
capture the ￿rst part of the argument. However, a visit cost would only reduce the scope for
DTCA, and not change any of the results qualitatively. The second part of the argument
- that patients "pressure" the physician to prescribe unnecessary medication - is, however,
not justi￿ed by empirical studies. As mentioned above, Iizuka and Jin (2005) ￿nd that
DTCA prompts physician visits, but has no in￿ uence on the physicians￿prescription choice.
We feel thus comfortable by not addressing this latter part of the argument.
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A Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2: Condition (19) can be written explicitly as
￿￿ (￿) = ￿ [￿r;￿r] ￿ ￿ [￿r j￿=0 ;0] > 0;
= pfN (￿)M [￿r] ￿ zM [￿r j￿=0]g ￿ fK [￿r;￿r] ￿ K [￿r j￿=0 ;0]g > 0:
34Inserting into this from the equilibrium condition for detailing, pN (￿r)M (￿r) = ￿rK￿ (￿r):as
by (12), we obtain the following expression:
￿￿ = ￿r (￿) ￿ K￿ (￿r (￿)) ￿ ￿r (0) ￿ K￿ (￿r (0)) ￿ K (￿r (￿);￿) + K (￿r (0);0); (41)
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which can be positive and negative depending on the relative size of the two terms. Evalu-
ating (43) for the equilibrium DTCA level, given by (13), and rearranging the expression,




















Obviously, this is positive if and only if K￿￿ > pN (e x ￿ 1=2): Using the detailing condition




e x ￿ 1=2
e x ￿ ￿(e x ￿ 1=2)
; (45)
where it is readily veri￿ed that38 e x￿1=2
e x￿￿(e x￿1=2) 2 (0;1):￿









= ￿22v (1 ￿ ￿) + t￿
2t(4 ￿ 3￿)
> 0;
where the equality follows after inserting the equilibrium price, as given by (21). Thus,
d￿c
dp > 0 and d￿c
dp > 0:Finally, the interaction between detailing and DTCA (14) and (15),




d￿ can be established under some mild conditions.
35Proof of Proposition 4: Following the ￿rst part of the proof of Proposition 2, we can
write











Using the best-response functions ￿c (￿) and pc = pc (￿) that follow from the system of

























Inserting into (47) from (48) and rearranging, we obtain:
d￿￿
d￿
= 2K￿￿ (1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ ￿)(4 ￿ 3￿c)￿pcM
￿￿
￿J0￿
￿￿￿1 ￿ K￿: (50)






















The RHS is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive. Using the ￿rst-order
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e x￿￿(e x￿ 1
2) < 0 , v ￿
t(8￿6￿c+3￿c2)
(8￿8￿c+3￿c2) : This completes
the proof of part (i). Part (ii) follows directly from a comparison of the RHS in (45) and
(52). ￿
39It can be veri￿ed that jJ
0j > 0 for any convex function K (￿):
36Proof of Proposition 5: Comparing (35) and (36) with the market outcomes in (12)

























where the superscript denotes the price regulation or the price competition case, i.e., k = r;c.
























Observe ￿rst that the right-hand sides (RHS) of (53) and (54) are identical, while the left-
hand sides (LHS) di⁄er. Since p and ￿ are only present on the RHS, then the ￿rst part of
the proposition follows.

























which is true by assumption. Thus, for a ￿ that implements ￿k = ￿fb, then ￿k < ￿fb must
be true. Vice versa, for a ￿ that implements ￿k = ￿fb, then ￿k > ￿fb must be true. Finally,
we know that e xfb = 1, while in equilibrium e xk < 1. This completes the proof. ￿
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